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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
WILLIAM CHARLES DENNIS,
Defendant-Respondent,

No. 17267

vs.
JAMES C. HOLDER, et al.,
Defendants-InIntervention and
Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant Government Employees Insurance Company
strongly disagrees with numerous factual statements made
by Respondents as well as their legal theories and analysis.
For the convenience of this Court,Appellant will adopt the
organizational outline utilized by Respondents in replying
to these erroneous statements.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondents state that the lower court "had almost
granted" a Motion for Directed Verdict to Respondents but
mysteriously decided to submit the case to the jury.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(Respondents' Brief, p. 1-2).

Such a statement is both

irrelevant and unsupported by the record in this case.
Next, Respondents assert that Instruction No. 14 was
erroneous since it spoke in terms of intention and required
an examination of facts and circumstances in deriving such
intention.

Respondents then conclude that the jury found

against them and in favor of Appellant "based on the testimony of William Charles Dennis that his intentions were
to eventually move out of his father's house and return to
Florida."

(Respondents' Brief, p. 2).

Such an assertion

is purely conjecture on the part of Respondents as to what
elements the jury utilized in its evaluation of the residency
question.

As such, Respondents' conjecture is entitled to

no weight whatsoever.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant does not dispute the standards outlined
regarding appellate review of judgments notwithstanding the
verdict.

Nor does it dispute that in cases in which only

one reasonable inference can be drawn from the facts it is
proper to reverse a jury verdict.

However, it should also

be noted that this Court has in the majority of cases
involving a judgment notwithstanding the verdict reversed
the lower court and reinstated the verdict on the grounds
that the lower court intruded upon contested issues of fact.
See for example, Winters v.

w.

S. Hatch Co., 546 P.2d 603
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(Utah 1976); Mel Hardman Production, Inc. v. Robinson,
604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979) and cases cited therein.

Unlike

the Kilpack case referred to by Respondents, the present
controversy contains disputed inferences based upon undisputed facts which could have resulted in a verdict for either
party.

Submission to the jury was thus required.
UNCONTROVERTED DISPOSITIVE FACTS

Respondents refer to some twelve numbered paragraphs
of "uncontroverted dispositive facts".
P. 4-6).

(Respondents' Brief,

Subsequently they refer to "Other Facts Which Are

Not Relevant or Material."

(Respondents' Brief, p. 8-9).

While Appellant agrees that the facts as stated were not
disputed, Appellant strongly disagrees with the slanted and
one-sided characterization of these facts and the complete
omission of other facts in Appellant's favor.

It is interesti:/

to note that all of the facts stated by Respondents in their
twelve-numbered paragraphs were argued by them in support of
residency.

On the other hand, all facts urged by Appellant

are either completely omitted in Respondents' Brief or are
categorized as "not relevant or material."
Appellant would submit that the facts listed in its
Brief in Chief aremuch more accurate and objective in presenting the evidence in support of both positions.
Brief, p. 16-19).

(Appellant'

Had the facts been as one-sided and clear

as represented by Respondents, there would be less doubt

-3-
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that a fact question existed and that the matter could be
determined as a question of law.

However, Respondents'

distorted view of the facts when compared with the evidence
in the record shows that a hotly contested controversy
existed and that numerous undisputed facts with disputed
inferences were presented by both parties.
ARGU~.ENT

STATEMENT OF THE APPLICABLE LAW TO THE
UNCONTROVERTED DISPOSITIVE FACTS.
Respondents place great evidence on an annotation contained at 93 A.L.R.3d 420-465.

Portions of the annotation

are even attached as an appendix to Respondents' Brief.
However, Respondents have completely distorted and misquoted
the annotation with regard to its treatment of "intentions"

:/

and the "inclusion" vs. "exclusion" category.

(Respondents'

Brie:', p. 7-8).
Respondents conclude that the annotation states that
if a child is not li "Jing apart in a separate household at
the time in question, the parties' intentions are not material
or relevant."

(Respondents' Brief, p. 7).

There is no such

statement made in the annotation in which intention is
excluded merely because a child is living at the insured's
home at the time of the accident.
Likewise, there is no discussion whatsoever contained
in the annotation in which inclusion cases are separated from

I

-4-

I

L
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exclusion cases.

Rather, the annotation notes that several

states have found the term "resident of household" ambiguous
and have therefore applied the definition more narrowly in
exclusion cases than in inclusion cases.

liowever, no attempt

has been made in the annotation, as have Respondents in their
Brief, to classify the cases on this basis.
Finally, Respondents assert there are no inclusion cases
in which a person who is living with the insured is deemed not
to have been a resident.

The relevance of this statement

is first, of little importance since each of the cases in
the annotation was based upon evidence adduced at trial and
concerned disputed facts.

Second, however, the statement is

incorrect since in the annotation itself the case of Indemnitv
Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 36 P.2d 271 (Okla. 1934), 93 A.L.R.3d at
440, holds that neither a daughter of the insured nor her
husband who were staying with the insured at the time of the
accident could be considered "residents of the same household.'
In addition, see Pamperin v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co., 197
N.W.2d 783 (Wis. 1972) where the court held that a

~iece

who was staying with her uncle at the time of the accident
was not a "resident of his household."

See also, Connolly v.

Galvin, 412 A.2d 428 (N.H. 1980).
For the preceding reasons, Appellant takes strong issue
with the characterizations made of the annotation and believes
that an examination of the annotation and the cases cited

-5-
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tnerein does not support Respondents' preliminary statements
contained in its Brief at pages 7 through 8.

It should also

be obser1ed that the "uncontroverted dispositive facts"
referred to in this section concern those facts most favorable to Respondents and completely ignores, as mentioned
supra, those facts and inferences favorable to Appellant.
THE LOWER COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT, AS
A MATTER OF LAW, THE ONLY REASONABLE INFERENCE
TO BE DRAWN FROM THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS WAS
THAT WILLIAM CHARLES DENNIS WAS A RESIDENT OF
HIS FATHER'S HOUSEHOLD AT THE Tit~ OF THE
ACCIDENT AND HENCE, AN ADDITIOtlAL INSURED UNDER
HIS FATHER'S POLICY OF LIABILITY INSURAJ.\!CE.
Respondents have attempted an elaborate analysis of
the cases decided in the country regarding the question of
residency of a household.

They have divided these cases

into the "inclusion" category in which a person is attempting
to become an additional insured under the terms of the policy
and the "exclusion" category in which the person, under
other provisions of an insurance policy, is attempting not
to be deemed a resident of the household in order that an
action may be brought against the insured.

These two cate-

gories are further broken down by the respondents to include
cases in which the claimant is either living with the insured
or is living away from the insured at the time of the
accident.
Under Respondents' analysis the question of "intention"
is not relevant in those instances where the claimant is
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living with the insured at the time of the accident and is
seeking to be included under the policy.

On the other hand,

Respondents state that "intention" is relevant to cases
involving exclusion even though the claimant is living
with the insured and to cases of inclusion where the claimant
is living apart from the insured.

In these latter two cate-

gories Respondents believe that questions of fact are created
while in the first category of inclusion Respondents state
that the question is solely a matter of law.
It is the position of Appellant that the distinctions
and categories cited by Respondents are completely irrelevant
to an analysis of the applicable case law and to a disposition '
of this case.

After extensive research Appellant has been

unable to find any authorities in which the distinctions
made by the respondents in their Brief have been recognized.
To the contrary, all authorities and all cases cited have
consistently stated that each case is dependent upon an
examination of its own facts and circumstances.
While Appellant admits that ambiguous policy language
can be construed narrowly or broadly in favor of an applicant seeking coverage, Appellant does not concede that the
term "resident of the same household" is in fact ambiguous
so as to require such an interpretation.

Appellant adopts

the statement contained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in which it states:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-The previous decisions of this court indicate
that no one factor is controlling and that all of
the elements must combine to a greater or lesser
degree in order to establish the relationship. We
also approve the previous determination of this
Court that the terms "resident or members of the
same household" as used in policies of automobile
liability insurance, are not ambiguous and, therefore,
should be construed in light of their plain and
common meaning.
It makes no difference whether the
terms are employed to define exclusion or inclusion
from coverage, or whether the question is one of
creating or terminating the relationship.
Pamperin
v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co., 197 N.W.2d 783, 789
(Wis. 1972) .
(Emphasis added) .
The Supreme Court of Connecticutt in Griffith v. Security
Insurance Co. of Hartford, 356 A.2d 94 (Conn. 1975) has said:
Appellee argues that the exclusion clause
here is ambiguous and should therefore be
construed ~ost strongly against the insurer.
We are of the view that the exclusionary provision of the policy is clear and legally unambiguous.
It is unnecessary to resort to rules of construction in order to ascertain the meaning of an
insurance policy when nc ambiguity exists.
See also, Stadelmann v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 147 N.W.2d
460 (Mich. App. 1967); Mun Quon Kok v. Pacific Ins. Co.,
462 P.2d 909
~,

(Haw. 1971); and Smitke v. Travelers Indemnity

118 N.W.2d 217

(Minn. 1959).

Those courts which have treated an exclusion policy
differently from an inclusion policy have first found the
term to be ambiguous.

Those other courts, which have not

founj such ambiguity, have refused to make any distinction.
Apfellant respectfully suggests that the terms "resident
of the same household" are indeed not ambiguous and should
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be given the common ordinary meaning contained in the
English language without reference to the effect such
determination has upon the policy and the claimant.
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the term is
ambiguous and that the rule is applicable which narrows
the interpretation given in exclusionary policies and
broadens it in inclusionary policies, such distinction still
does not support the judgment N.O.V. granted by the lower
court.

In this particular instance, for example, the only

method in which a broad interpretation of the terms could
be applied to the facts of this case concerned the instructions to the iury given by the lower court.

In other words,

it is only by the definition applied to the term "resident
of the same household" by which a broad or narrow definition
can be established.

The jury then utilizing such definition

applies the law to the facts of the case in reaching its
conclusion.
Instruction No. 14 correctly stated the standard to
be applied even in a case in which a broad interpretation of
the term is utilized.

As will be noted infra there is no

authority which states that intention is not a relevant factor
in determining coverage even when the policy is broadly
interpreted.

In addition, Respondents have filed no cross-

appeal from this instruction and so, for the purposes of
this appeal, the instruction must be considered correct.

-9-
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As such, therefore, the jury was correctly instructed
as to the standard to be applied in determining residency
even under a broad interpretation given to inclusionary
policies where ambiguous language is deemed to have existed.
Respondents throughout the argument portion of their
brief continually state two propositions:

(1) That as a

matter of law cases can be decided where the claimant is
living with the insured in inclusionary cases and (2) that
intention of the claimant is not relevant in inclusion
cases in which the claimant is living with the insured.
The chart contained in Respondents' Brief (p. 16-17)
is both erroneous and misleading in these respects.

First,

it is only Respondents themselves who have made the distinctions and categories contained in the chart.

The courts

themselves have failed to apply these elaborate distinctions
as have all legal authorities discovered by Appellant.
Second, Respondents have in numerous cases stated "no jury"
but have failed to note that the decision was that of a
fact finder judge and that the findings of the judge were
reviewed by the appellate court just
from a jury.

as would be a verdict

Third, the characterizations in many of the

cases that intention was not relevant or considered is
incorrect.
A review of all of these cases shows that with only two
exceptions the circumstances and facts of each case determined
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_j

the outcome regardless of whether it was an ''inclusion case"
or an "exclusion case" and whether the claimant was living
with the insured or was away from the insured.

As noted

in Appellant's Brief in Chief, the conflicting inferences
existing in this case clearly required a fact finder to make
a determination based upon the evidence and the applicable
definitions.
A brief review of the cases listed in Respondents' chart
and the errors contained therein is as follows:
l.

Buddin v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.

The Supreme

Court of South Carolina reversed a jury verdict in which a
nephew was deemed not to be a resident of his uncle's house.
The court noted that a judgment N.O.V. should only be granted
if the evidence is susceptible to only one reasonable

infer~a

The court then noted the facts of that case including that

t~

nephew had no other place to go, had no furniture except at
his uncle's, ate all his food there, and had no intention
of looking for another place or moving.

157 S.E.2d 635.

The court failed to note a single factor opposing or contradicting residency in direct contrast to the instant case.
The court then concluded:
In our opinion, under the cases cited, there
were no factual issues in this case for the jury
to resolve. The evidence here is susceptible of
on~y one reasonable inference.
Id. at 637.
It should be noted that the court made no distinction between
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inclusion or exclusion and the fact that the nephew was
actually living with the uncle at the time of the accident.
This case simply stands for the proposition that since
there were no facts to the contrary, there was no factual
determination necessary.
2.

Hardware Mutual v. Horne Indemnity Co.

The decision

in this case involved the findings of the trial court as a
fact finder.

The lower court found that a nephew was a

resident of his aunt and uncle's home.
as a matter of law.

It was not decided

The court also noted that the term

"residence" means "a temporary or permanent dwelling place,
abode, or habitation to which one intends to

retur~

as

distinguished from a place of ternpo=ary sojourn on transient
visit."
3.
C8.

50 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
Jamestown Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins.

Again, this appeal involved a review of findings of

fact by the lower court in which it was determined that a
son was a relative in his father's household.

As noted by

the appellate court:
William Clark Hamrick had no home of his own.
He went back to his father's house, carrying with
him all of his possessions. His intent was to
remain there until living quarters more convenient
to his employment could be found and the living
arrangements made for his occupancy of them.
We think it clear that under the circumstances he
was a "resident of the same household" as his
father.
He is not in the same position as an
adult child who has a home of his own to which
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he intends to return and is making a mere
visit to his parents. 147 S.E.2d at 417.
(Emphasis added) .
3A.

It should be noted that the Pamperin case should

have been included in the first category of "living with
inclusion cases" contained in Respondents' chart but was
erroneously put in the "exclusion" cases.

To maintain ease

of comparison, Appellant will discuss this case in its
present position.
4.

United Services Automobile Assn. v. Mione.

Again,

this was a case tried before a judge who made specific
findings and conclusions as to whether a daughter was a
resident of her father's household.

The court noted:

Important factors are the subjective or
declared intent of the individual, the relationship between the individuals and the members of
the household, the existence of a second place
of lodging, and the relative permanence or
transient nature of the individual's residence
in the household.
528 P.2d at 420.
The court noted no distinction between children living with
their parents and children separated from their parents in
applying this test.
5.

Hardesty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.

This case is quoted extensively in Appellant's main brief.
It stands for the proposition, as evidenced by the second
remand, that the residency of an individual is a question of
fact and not a matter of law.

Since there were two potential

homes in this case, just as in the instant case, the sole

-13-
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question to be determined was whether the claimant was a
resident of the insured's household.

The additional

residence always makes the determination a more difficult
question than when there is no other living quarters
available to the claimant as in several of the other cases
cited.
6.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Means.

This case

was also extensively cited in Appellant's Brief in Chief.
Again, the court made no distinction in applying a different
standard to a case in which the minor had left the residence
as to cases where the minor resided at the residence.

The

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, after reviewing the undisputed
facts, noted the disputed inferences stating:
There are many cases where a contract of insurance may be construed as a matter of law and the
question of liability vel non decided as such by
the court.
There are other cases where there is
a conflict in the evidence er where different
inferences are permissible under the uncontroverted
evidentiary facts.
In the latter kind of situation
the issue is a fact issue and one which is properly
submitted to the jury.
382 F.2d at 29.
7.

American States Ins. Co. v. Walker.

Again, Respon-

dents failed to note that this Court affirmed the findings
of fact entered by the lower court.

In that decision,

this Court failed to note any substantial difference in
standard because a child is living or not living at the
residence at the time of the accident.

This Court noted

the following:
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A resident of a household is one who is a
member of a family who lives under the same roof.
Residence emphasizes membership in a group rather
than an attachment to a building.
It is a matter
of intention and choice rather than one of geography.
The trial court heard the evidence and made
a finding that at the time of the collision Dixie
Ann Walker was still a resident of her father's
household. Whether we would have made the same
ruling had we tried the case is immaterial, and
on appeal we are not justified in substituting our
judgment for his, since the evidence was such as
to sustain his judgment.
486 P.2d at 1044.
8.

Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Granillo.

The Granillc

case was one in which summary judgment was granted on the
basis that the affidavit and exhibit showed no dispute as
to facts or inferences.

In that case no discussion was made

by the court as to a different standard applied to exclusion
cases vs. inclusion cases.

There, the married daughter of

a service man had moved into her parent's home.

The facts

reviewed by the court are remarkably similar to the facts in
the instant case.

The daughter in Granillo intended to

resi~

in her parent's home only until she could afford to rent her
own home, did not consider herself a member of the family
and her father considered her a guest in his home.

The court

noted that the girl's car was never used by the family nor
the family's car by the girl.

The court also observed she

brought neither furniture nor other possessions with her when
whe left her home in Yuma.

The court stated that the intended
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duration of a relationship is a fact to be considered in
such cases.

Again, the court failed to note any different

standard which would have been applied had there been an
inclusion question rather than an exclusion question.
9.

Pamperin v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co.

As noted

supra, this case should have been included in the inclusion
living together category.

The court in this case held as a

matter of law that a niece who was staying with her uncle
was not an insured under his policy.

Thus, this case is the

exact opposite of the 3uddin case in which that court held
as a matter of law that the nephew was a resident.

noted that there were three factors to be
determining residency of a household.
the same roof;

(2)

(l)

The court

considered in
Living under

in a close, intimate and informal relation-

ship; and (3) where the intended duration is likely to be
substantial.

The court stated:

Living together under one roof as a family is
neither the sole nor the controlling test of whether
a person is a resident or member of a household.
In
addition, the intended duration of the relationship
is a necessary element whether the atte~pt is to show
the creation or the termination of the relationship.
197 N.W.2d at 787.
10.
v. Maca.

National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co.
Respondents incorrectly state the conclusion reached

in the Maca case.

In that case on summary judgment the court

held that the son was a resident of his father's household
and could not sue his father.
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the claimants and therefore the court held that the record
established, as a matter of law, that the son who had no
other quarters and who intended on remaining with his father
indefinitely was indeed a resident of his father's household.
A review of the preceding cases in the chart formulated
by the respondents shows that in almost every instance the
question of residency was one of fact, not law.

In those

few cases in which the court ruled as a matter of law as
to residency, the facts and inferences were held to be
undisputed and incapable of more than one conclusion.

In

such cases there was no separate living quarters or other
circumstances in which conflicting inferences could be made.
Respondents have attempted to create categories of cases
which are not recognized in any of the opinions cited by
Respondents or in any legal authority.

The distinction be-

tween inclusion and exclusion cases is only applied by courts
in those cases in which the terms are deemed to be

ambig~ous

and where the definitions themselves are either enlarged or
restricted.

Such definitions are in the form of jury

instructions which, in the instant case, must be considered
correct since Respondents have failed to cross-appeal from
the instructions given.
The distinction attempted by Respondents makes little
sense.

Under Respondents' analyses if a son visits his

parents for three days and intends on returning the following
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day he would be automatically included under his father's
policy as an additional insured since he "resided under
his father's roof" on the day of the accident regardless of
his intention of leaving the following day.

Taking the same

facts, however, into an exclusion case, according to the
Respondents, would require an examination of the son's intention and a finding that he was not a resident of the household since he did not intend on staying.
Likewise, if the son went to his own apartment the
following day and then became involved in an accident
Respondents would urge that a new standard be applied since
he was not then residing under his father's roof.

Then, his

intention and future plans would again come into play even
though had he had the accident the previous night before
leaving his father's home his intention would have been
irrelevant.
Such an analysis is obviously falacious.

The standards

to be applied in determining residency of a household are
applicable in all situations regardless of whether an inclusion, exclusion, living apart from the insured or living
with the insured is present.

If the court chooses to narrow

the definitional terms involved in defining residents of a
household that is the court's prerogative under ambiguous
insurance policies.

However, there are no cases which say

that intention is eliminated completely in narrowing the
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definitional standard.
It should also be considered that insurance policies
are written and premiums are paid based upon the intention
of the insuring parties.

In the present case, for example,

Donald Dennis, the father of William Dennis, some two weeks
before the accident failed to change his application of
insurance to list his son as an additional driver of the
family automobile.

(Tr. 490, Exhibit 4).

The testimony is

also consistent that his father considered his son only to
be residing at the residence until he could get enough money
to go back to Florida and that he had an understanding with
his son that he would only stay there long enough to get himself straightened out.

(Tr. 498).

The obvious purpose of such a clause is to restrict
the number of insureds which a premium goes to protect.

If

intended duration is not a factor to be considered, as urged
by Respondents, then any relative who happens to be lucky
enough to be residing in an insured's home on the night of
the accident would automatically receive coverage.

Such a

standard makes no sense in law or logic and the distinctions
attempted to be made by Respondents are not valid or recognize:
under the authorities.
For these reasons, the trial court erred in overruling
the jury verdict finding of non-residency when the inferences
in this case were clearly disputed and in which intention of
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the insured was clearly an issue of relevance.
CONCLUSION
Respondents in their brief have attempted to divert
this Court's attention to the real issue in this case
which is whether there was sufficient conflict of factual
inferences to justify submission to a jury.

Instead,

Respondents have attempted to create and categorize selected
cases into a pattern for the purpose of trying to show that
under the facts of this case the question is one of law
and not fact.
A reading of the cases cited by the respondents showed
that they have distorted and mischaracterized numerous
decisions for the purpose of neatly fitting them into the
niches developed under Repondents' theory.

In most cases,

however, the cases fit the theory as well as round pegs in
square holes.
A review of the numerous cases throughout the United
States and this Court's own case in Walker shows unequivocably
that the facts of each case are the critical and sole focus
of decision.

Only in rare instances where there is virtually

no evidence opposing the contention of residency has the
matter been decided as a question of law and not fact.
The jury in this case was given an instruction which
<0ven Respondents admit was basically correct.

Respondents'

only complaint as to the definitional terms concerns the
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question of intent.

As noted throughout this Brief, however,

Respondents have cited no authority showing that intent is
not an element in all cases including inclusion "living
together" cases.
As such, the jury evaluated the record and concluded
that William Dennis was merely staying with his family on
a temporary basis to overcome a drug dependency, that his
family did not consider him to be a member of the family but
merely a guest for a short duration, that all of his ties
including personal and possessional were in Florida, that
at the time of the accident he had a separate apartment in
Florida where the majority of his possessions were kept, that
as far as Dennis himself was concerned, he had a household
in Florida and wanted to return to it from the day he arrived
in Utah and on the day of the accident itself.
While Respondents can cite contrary inferences and facts
in their favor, it was for the jury, not the trial court, to
decide which set of facts established the "residency of the
same household" as contained in the insurance policy.

The

lower court was obviously swayed by Respondents' categorization effort in persuading the lower court that in cases
involving a child living at home in which iaclusion is being
sought there is no question of fact present and the child
is automatically deemed to be a resident.
The lower court's conclusion is not supported by any
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authority cited in these briefs.

While admittedly the scope

of definition can be extended or restricted by a court in
ambiguous insurance policies, there are no decisions which
state that factual examination is not relevant in cases
where the child is living at home and claims inclusion.

The

repeated assertions in support of this theory by the respondents are simply not supported by any legal authorities or,
by even common sense.
For the preceding reasons, therefore, Appellant respectfully submits that this Court reinstate the jury verdict and
remand the case to the district court for entry of the
appropriate order.
Respectfully submitted.
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN

OyD~~
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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